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Parameters Autumn 2008 Daniel S. Roper |
Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War Though policy initiatives since September 11, 2001 have positively influenced certain agencies in their efforts to secure America, some steps have actually limited the nation's effectiveness in countering the threats it faces.  |
Parameters Spring 2004 Robert R. Tomes |
Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare Thirty years after the signing of the January 1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq.  |
Parameters Summer 2007 Brian Reed |
A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency A network analysis of war and insurgency differs markedly from conventional approaches, a fact that might require us to rethink some of our more conventional analytical tools.  |
Parameters Winter 2006/2007 Jim Baker |
Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies This article presents the essentials of a successful counterinsurgency strategy by applying a technique known as systems thinking. Systems thinking has proven successful in other contexts at explaining human behavior, policy choices, unintended consequences, and the resistance of systems to change.  |
Parameters Summer 2005 Christopher M. Ford |
Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency Using Iraq as a model, this article seeks to examine the relationship between the people and the insurgency, with the ultimate questions being: What role does the civilian population play in the insurgency, and how can this situation be influenced to achieve success?  |
Parameters Summer 2007 Clancy & Crossett |
Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare There is little foundational understanding of what success means in irregular warfare that will assist analysts in interpreting operational effectiveness.  |
Parameters Summer 2008 Robert M. Chamberlain |
With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN This article questions the assumption that enhancing the power of the state will make the population less likely to support insurgents.  |
Parameters Winter 2005/2006 Jeffrey Record |
Why the Strong Lose Why has the United States fared consistently well against such powerful enemies as Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union, but its record against lesser foes is decidedly mixed?  |
Parameters Summer 2008 Kenneth Payne |
Waging Communication War This article sets out to explore the ramifications of poor communication and lack of support of the population in a modern war.  |
Parameters Winter 2006/2007 Martin J. Muckian |
Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary The ongoing conflict in Iraq has sparked a renewed interest in the study of counterinsurgency, leading many to comb the wars of the twentieth century for lessons that can be applied to today. Much of this recent analysis has focused on the knowledge gained from fighting Marxist revolutionaries.  |
Parameters Summer 2007 Frank G. Hoffman |
Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency? A look at the impact and implications of the classical school of thought on revolutionary warfare and an evaluation of the newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual.  |
Parameters Spring 2006 Wade Markel |
Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control Thirty years after the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. and its Army again find themselves confronted with a tenacious insurgency, this time in Iraq. Here's a look at Britain's victory in Malaya as a model to emulate.  |
Parameters Autumn 2006 Michael R. Melillo |
Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities Unfortunately, it took the tragedy of 9/11 and the challenges posed by an adaptive enemy for the U.S. to realize it was not prepared to fight war on terms other than its own choosing.  |
Parameters Summer 2006 Lou DiMarco |
Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War Torture also has been the subject of much domestic political debate in the US. The French experience in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 is one of the clearest examples of how ill-conceived interrogation techniques contributed directly to the strategic failure of a counterinsurgency and the success of an insurgency.  |
Parameters Autumn 2008 Robert M. Cassidy |
Terrorism and Insurgency Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives is a collection of essays that provide insight into the challenges that make this perennial and irregular war exceedingly difficult.  |
Parameters Summer 2006 David W. Barno |
Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency Strategy in a global counterinsurgency requires a new level of thinking. A world of irregular threats and asymmetrical warfare demands that we Americans broaden our thinking beyond the norms of traditional military action once sufficient to win our wars.  |
Parameters Spring 2005 Timothy K. Deady |
Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902 These events--from a century ago--share a number of striking parallels with the events of 2003 and 2004. The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was America's first major combat operation of the 20th century.  |
Parameters Spring 2005 Metz & Millen |
Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment A historic shift has taken place in the strategic environment as globalization and interconnectedness propel the concept of security in new, unforeseen directions  |
Parameters Summer 2006 Robert M. Cassidy |
The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency A task force that organizes and integrates special, conventional, and indigenous forces against terrorists, leveraging the best counterinsurgency practices, would be able to carry out the full range of counterinsurgency requirements within an autonomous area of operations.  |
Parameters Autumn 2008 |
Commentary & Reply Dispute over using airpower in counterinsurgency (COIN)... Waging the communication war...  |
National Defense March 2005 Roxana Tiron |
Insurgents Learn to Exploit U.S. Military's Vulnerabilities As insurgents continue to develop more lethal means to attack U.S. forces and allies in Iraq, both military and private security officials have been conducting briefings on how to recognize and avoid the ubiquitous threats of suicide bombs, roadside mines and ambushes.  |
Parameters Autumn 2006 Jeffrey Record |
External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success For either the insurgent side or the counterinsurgent side, material strength unguided by sound strategy and unsupported by sufficient willingness to fight and die is a recipe for almost certain defeat. But most insurgencies seek foreign help for good reason.  |
National Defense August 2007 James A. Gavrilis |
Army Must Embrace Unconventional Fight Even a major unconventional campaign such as Iraq can have major conventional operations as part of it. In war the two are not mutually exclusive. The trick is finding the right mix.  |
Parameters Summer 2004 Robert M. Cassidy |
Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars This article aims to distill some of the more relevant counterinsurgency lessons from the American military's experiences during Vietnam and before.  |
National Defense September 2005 Sandra Erwin |
Defense Dept. Rhetoric Reflects War Frustrations Defense officials know so little about the insurgency American troops are combating in Iraq they decided that detailed information about the enemy, such as its strength and capabilities, is not all that important to winning the war.  |
Parameters Summer 2007 |
From the Editor Although hamstrung by a myriad of political, economic, and cultural realities, visionaries share one common opinion regarding the future of the Middle East; Iran will play a pivotal role.  |
National Defense March 2007 Sandra I. Erwin |
Special Forces' Skills `Needed More Than Ever' Experts are questioning whether the Pentagon is making the best use of highly skilled special operations forces in the nation's war against extremist Islamic groups.  |
National Defense November 2005 Sandra I. Erwin |
Intelligence: The Silver Bullet That Will Beat the Insurgency Until the military can come to grips with their intelligence problem in Iraq, it will continue to pay the price in the form of casualties, which have now reached nearly 2,000 dead and more than 14,000 wounded.  |
IEEE Spectrum November 2007 Robert N. Charette |
Open-Source Warfare Terrorists are leveraging information technology to organize, recruit, and learn -- and the West is struggling to keep up. The conflict in Iraq highlights how the open global access to increasingly powerful technological tools is in effect allowing small groups to declare war on nations.  |
Wired November 27, 2007 Noah Shachtman |
How Technology Almost Lost the War: In Iraq, the Critical Networks Are Social -- Not Electronic A network-centric approach to war allows us to swiftly locate our target and destroy it, but it doesn't allow us to connect with local people to rebuild a city.  |
National Defense May 2008 Sandra I. Erwin |
In Today's Wars, Air Strikes Under Fire The Air Force and the Army feud over who gets to be in charge of the "big guns" on the battlefield. The rivalry has become irrelevant in current wars, where one doesn't win by killing, but by gaining the trust of the population.  |
National Defense October 2005 Sandra I. Erwin |
Marines Probing New Ways to Fight Future Insurgencies Officials stress that the aim is not to write a war plan for the current conflict Iraq, but rather to generate fresh ideas for countering so-called "irregular" threats in the coming decades.  |
National Defense August 2007 Grace Jean |
Defense Technologies for an Uncertain Future The United States is at a crossroads when it comes to developing defense technologies for a future that seems obscure at best.  |
Fast Company October 2000 Robert B. Reich |
Your Job Is Change When change programs are doomed before they start ... When old leaders are stumped by new challengers ... When change itself is changing ...  |
National Defense August 2005 Joe Pappalardo |
A Single Day Changed Supply Strategy in Iraq A coordinated sabotage of supply roads in Iraq changed the way the U.S. Army's support command had to do business from that point on.  |
National Defense January 2006 Stew Magnuson |
Adaptive Foe Thwarts Counter-IED Efforts Coalition forces are engaged in an ongoing invisible combat in the radio and infrared spectra. Iraqi insurgents have progressed from simple trip wires to infrared devices to set off improvised explosive devices.  |